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Abstract:  The world crisis has begun showing its effects in Romania in 
October 2008. Still, the immaturity of Romanian authorities in the political 
and economic fields, as well as the enthusiasm of economic development led 
to an unconscious state of mind regarding the crisis. Therefore, Romanian 
companies have not started preparing for the crisis until they began feeling 
its effects. Also, a large number of Romanian managers are not familiar with 
crisis inversion strategies and accept crisis as an invincible necessity. Still, in 
other economies we can find examples of managers who fight for saving their 
companies and even try gaining competitive advantage based on the crisis. 
We have tried to find out if Romanian managers belong to the second type. 
Mainly, the study focuses on strategies adopted by Romanian companies in 
order to counterbalance or, at least, ensure their survival during the world 
crisis. 
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ARGUMENT 
Fluctuations in economy are natural phases of an economic cycle. Generally, 
economists agree that the main phases of a business cycle are expansion, 
prosperity, contraction, and recession (if recession is deep, it can be considered 
‘crisis’). Some argue that “an economic crisis is not a temporary weakness of the 
economy, but the economic expression of a wider issue, which raises questions 
about world philosophy and which influences all countries in the world” (Didier, 
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1998). No matter how we define it, specialists are unanimous that companies react 
too late and too slow (Brilman, 1985). There may be several reasons for these 
reactions: anticipation that circumstances will be better; belated use of economical 
indicators; confusion between structural crisis and circumstacional evolution; 
absence of monthly calculated indicators; not enough exigency from managers and 
shareholders; accounting anesthesia; no correlation between company results and 
inflation rate; too optimistic budgets; inability to manage the crisis; intervention 
from authorities (Brilman, 1985). 
In the 1960s, the historical existence of business cycles was perceived as the 
outcome of a lack of economic insight (Solomou, 1998). Business cycles were very 
long at the end of the 19
th century (up to 20 years), they shrank to 5 years after 
World War II and they lengthened again after 1970 (up to 10 years).  
The two latest notable crises (the Asian crisis of 1997 and the Argentine 
crisis of 2002) have offered important insight regarding misfunctionalities in the 
industry. Two factors are common to the two crises: quality of macroeconomic 
policy and ingenuity of markets (V’yugina, 2009).  
The current world crisis is considered by some the most serious one the 
world has even experienced. Developed countries have been very cautious and 
prepared for the crisis at least a year in advance, while Central and Eastern 
European countries (in particular, Romania) have been mostly preoccupied by 
economic growth, internal market consumption and means to attract foreign 
investors instead of readjusting macroeconomic policies. The purpose of this paper 
was to analyze the situation of Romania and to try to identify strategies used by 
managers of Romanian companies in order to try overcome the crisis. The study 
was performed between March and July 2009. 
WHY THE CRISIS? 
The president of Federal Reserve, Ben Bernanke, believes that the current 
world financial crisis is the most severe one since the 1930s (Macovei, 2009). He 
supports the idea that the origins of the global economic decline can be found in 
the disfunctionalities of the commercial and capital balance in the years 1990s. 
Bernanke explained that the imbalance has been generated by the fact that, during a 
decade, emerging economies (e.g. Asian countries) benefited from capital coming 
from American or partner countries investors and, therefore, developed countries 
recorded important exports of financial capital.  CRISIS INVERSION STRATEGIES – THEORY OR REALITY IN ROMANIA OF 2009? 
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Certain specialists tend to consider the current crisis as an inevitable, but not 
extraordinary accident, a consequence of the very low interest rates used in the past 
few years in the United States and in Europe (Daianu, 2008 III). 
Still, an analysis of the crisis cannot exclude structural causes. The 
globalization of financial markets, as well as financial innovations, combined with 
weak or lack of regulations and with conflicts of interest became premises for the 
current crisis. But how was it possible that the same specialists who draw up 
economic policies ignored the strong warnings, the analyses and the conclusions of 
previous crises? Some specialists dare to consider that very important financial 
interests played a major part (Daianu, 2008 I). 
In 2005, professor Nouriel Roubini
1 warned that home prices had created a 
wave which would sink the economy. At the time, he was considered a Cassandra 
and called “Dr. Doom”. In September 2006, he warned the International Monetary 
Fund that the crisis was about to begin and that the United States would be 
confronted with a housing bust, an oil shock, sharply declining consumer 
confidence and, ultimately, a deep recession. By the end of 2008, most of its 
predictions were confirmed, while his descriptions of crisis causes and effects were 
proven correct. 
Paul Krugman
2 is well-known for its criticism towards the Bush 
administration and towards Alan Greenspan, former president of Federal Reserve, 
whom he accuses of disregarding some warnings, of having blind confidence in the 
free market and of not reading the signs that the financial system created after the 
1929-1933 crisis has outgrown defenses. Krugman supported the idea that Alan 
Greenspan is “like a man who suggests leaving the barn door ajar, and then – after 
the horse is gone – delivers a lecture on the importance of keeping your animals 
properly locked up” (Krugman, 2008). 
If analyzing the situation of the past twelve months, as well as taking 
specialists’ opinion into consideration, we can appreciate that the most troubling 
effect is massive unemployment. “The financial crisis may generate loss of 20 
million more work places by the end of 2009”, warned the General Manager of the 
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International Labor Organization, Juan Somavia, in December 2008. He even 
added that “these numbers can be worse and cause a severe, long and global social 
crisis, based on the crisis impact on the real economy” (Leclerc, 2008). 
THE CRISIS IN THE ROMANIAN CONTEXT 
During the year 2008, Romania recorded the highest economic growth after 
1990. The GDP grew by 7.1% (Mediafax, 2009) along the year 2008 and the 
predicted level had been 9.1%, should the effects of the crisis had not begun being 
felt in the fourth quarter. The Romanian authorities had estimated growth of 2.5% 
in 2009, but the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and other 
international organizations were less optimistic. We expected at a decrease of 5.7% 
in GDP for the year 2009 (Comache, 2009) and we recorded a decrease of 6.6%. 
The National Bank of Romania has been asked several times to explain its 
position regarding the fact that Romania would not be severely affected by the 
crisis. Apparently, the Romanian financial market is still primitive. For example, at 
the end of 2008, the percentage of financial intermediaries is 25% in Romania, 
compared to 80-90% in the developed economies of the European Union (Daianu, 
2008 II). The country has felt the effect of turbulences caused by certain foreign 
investors, who decided to close their positions in Romania, similar to what 
happened in other neighboring economies (e.g. Hungary, Poland). In August 2008, 
Romania had not yet felt the effect of overheating in the economy. Specialists 
argued that the Romanian real estate market is not confronted with a crisis, as it is 
just beginning to grow and it would take about 20 years to become saturated. The 
real estate market was effectively blocked when the National Bank of Romania 
restricted the population access to bank loans.  
During the fourth quarter of 2008, the National Bank seemed to be able to 
counterbalance the effects of the crisis and the governor, Mugur Isărescu, was very 
optimistic: “we have to be thankful that we have recorded GDP growth in the past 
ten years. We now have the change to overcome the world crisis. We can even 
consider our country a miracle, as the crisis has offered us some advantages” 
(Ziarul Financiar, 2008). 
The manically depressive attitude of the Romanian government towards the 
crisis is awkward, to say the least (Chirovici, 2008). Authorities are in the situation 
of a medicine who, during one year, has assured a person (the national economy) 
that he/she is in good health and, all of the sudden, he has to inform him/her that CRISIS INVERSION STRATEGIES – THEORY OR REALITY IN ROMANIA OF 2009? 
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he/she is going to die. At the end of the year 2007, when all Europe was concerned 
for the crisis, Romanian authorities were asked if they had performed a crisis 
impact study for Romania. Their answer was unimaginable: “what crisis?” At the 
EU and G8 level, the crisis was the main topic, while in Bucharest the environment 
was unrealistic: the economy developed, billions of Euros could not wait to enter 
the country and the country had no reason to worry. It is only at the end of 2008 
that Romania entered the depressive phase: we were expecting a true economic 
cyclone, unemployment rate grew and specialists became less optimistic. 
CRISIS INVERTION STRATEGIES 
This type of strategies is used when a valuable business is in crisis. The main 
purpose is to block and inverse the sources of financial and competition 
weaknesses. The first step is to correctly diagnose problems and to identify the 
level (decision, implementation, execution or evaluation) at which they have 
appeared. The most frequent cases are (Ciobanu & Ciulu, 2005): 
  ignoring interest compression effects generated by market forestall through 
aggressive price cuts; 
  underused production capacity and, therefore, increase in fixed unitary costs; 
  exclusive concentration on R&D efforts to improve position and profitability, 
followed by innovational failure; 
  investment in expensive and long term absorptive technologies; 
  frequent change of strategy; 
  vassalage to competitive advantages of successful competitors. 
There are five ways of approaching crisis inversion strategies (Hofer, 1980): 
1.  strategy revision involves rebuilding competitive position, adjustment of 
internal and functional area strategies, rethinking strategy following a merger 
or acquisition based on new company strengths or concentration on a customer 
or product area. Before taking action, it is necessary to perform a SWOT 
analysis. A successful business recovery must always be based on strengths 
and attractive development opportunities; 
2.  fast income growth targets sales improvement by cost cuts, promotional 
activities, fast product and after-sales improvement. If demand is not price 
sensitive, prices should be increased, not diminished. This type of strategy is 
useful when operating budget is limited and the company is confronted with 
overcapacity. The grouped offer involves selling separable products and Ruxandra CIULU 
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services to consumers in packages. For example, IBM grouped software, 
hardware and service, which created economies of scale, pushed them up the 
learning curve generated network economies and salespeople productivity 
increase. These are all levers for cost cuts. Therefore, package price is lower 
than the sum of its constituents. Moreover, grouped offer allows the company 
to differentiate by selling only some package components. Cross-subvention 
implies deliberate sales of a basic product for a low profit or even without 
profit in order to sell more profitable products. It is the case of Gillette, who 
successfully applied the ‘razor and safety razor’ strategy. The safety razor was 
sold with no profit, while the razors are extremely profitable. 
3.   cost cuts are made possible by strict cost control, elimination of unuseful 
positions and activities, productivity growth by using modern production 
equipments and postponing investments. 
4.  sales of assets (Heany, 1985) are used when business winding is a critical 
issue and can be solved by sales of equipments (patents, machines, land, 
profitable subunits) or by reorganization for economic purposes (eliminating 
low-profitability products, selling or closing old capacities, reducing work 
force); many times, money saved in these ways is reinvested to consolidate the 
main activity. 
5.  combined efforts (Finkin, 1985) generally involve changing the management 
team; the new management has the freedom to operate any changes it 
considers necessary. The more difficult the problems which need to be solved, 
the more necessary their multiple approach at all company levels. 
The crisis inversion strategies are risky and often fail due to bad choice of 
acquisition moment or due to early drain of financial resources or necessary 
businessman talents. 
Also, it is important to evaluate the most frequent causes of bankruptcy, now 
and thirty years ago in order to identify changes in environment and in company 
behavior. A statistics published in 1977 by the French ‘Caisse Nationale des 
Marchés de l’État’ (CNME) identified nine main causes of bankruptcy (Brilman, 
1985): customer weaknesses (21%); overstocking (11%); bank pressures (11%); 
illness or death of the business initiator (10%); over dimensioned personnel 
expenses (10%); accounting mistakes; failure to price product correctly (9%); 
decrease of sales (8%); expropriations (8%); inadequate management (6%). CRISIS INVERSION STRATEGIES – THEORY OR REALITY IN ROMANIA OF 2009? 
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In 2009, eleven causes of bankruptcy can be identified, as following (Mason, 
2009): choosing a business that isn’t very profitable; inadequate cash reserves; 
failure to clearly define and understand your market, your customers, and your 
customers’ buying habits; failure to price your product or service correctly; failure 
to adequately anticipate cash flow; failure to anticipate or react to competition, 
technology, or other changes in the marketplace; overgeneralization; 
overdependence on a single customer; uncontrolled growth; believing you can do 
everything yourself; putting up with inadequate management. Two of these causes 
(failure to price product correctly and inadequate management) are maintained in 
the top causes of bankruptcy, while several others overlap, due to environmental 
changes. 
THE ROMANIAN REALITY – CASE STUDY 
Based on the economic situation of Romania and on the very late reaction of 
Romanian authorities, we decided to perform a study among companies which are 
active on the Romanian market. The main purpose of this study is to identify 
managerial perspective on the crisis and the actions they have taken in order to 
ensure survival by the end of the crisis. By choosing two different domains, the 
banking system and the distribution/production of pharmaceutical products and 
sanitary materials, we have intended to give a full picture of crisis effects and crisis 
inversion strategies used by companies. The sample was chosen based on the 
number of companies acting in each domain. The list of banks approved by the 
National Bank of Romania includes 40 banks, while the number of distributors in 
the pharmaceutical and sanitary field includes about 70 companies. Also, I 
approached 5 of the top 10 pharmaceutical companies in terms of sales value in 
Romania (4 multinational, 1 local). Questionnaires were sent and filled in during 
the month of March 2009. Response rates are included in Table 1: 
Table 1 Response rates to questionnaires 
Field  Number of 
questionnaires sent 
Number of 
questionnaires received  Percentage
Bank services  20  16  80% 
Distributor of pharmaceutical 
products or sanitary materials  35 21  60% 
Pharmaceutical products 
manufacturers  5 5  100% 
TOTAL 60  42   Ruxandra CIULU 
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The distribution of respondents by field is presented in Figure 1. 
The questionnaire includes 11 questions, among which 10 strictly refer to the 
crisis and one is meant to obtain general information about companies. Out of the 
ten questions, 4 are meant to identify problems with which companies are 
confronted and 6 aim at identifying strategies used in their attempt to 
counterbalance crisis effects.  
 
Figure 1 Percentage of filled-in questionnaires by field 
Answers provided by distributors and manufacturers are rather similar, but 
fairly different from those provided by banks. Since the crisis began showing its 
effects in Romania (in September-October 2008) until March 2009, distributors 
and manufacturers recorded stagnation or even growth in sales, benefits, market 
value, customer fidelity, possibility to implement company strategy, new business 
opportunities, ability to invest in new businesses, in mergers/acquisitions or even in 
entering new markets. On the other side, banks reported stagnation or weaker 
results in all the above-mentioned fields. The only two fields on which all 
respondents agreed upon were liquidity level and ability to access capital, for 
which they all report drawbacks. 
Regarding sales for the fourth quarter of 2008 compared to the fourth quarter 
of 2007, banks recorded declines of 1% to 20%, even though some banks reported 
increase of 1% to 20%. The crisis did not have a major impact on distributors and 
manufacturers by the end of 2008, as demand for their products increased during 
the same period and some even improved their production capacity in order to meet 
demand. Obviously, all companies were affected by payment delays, increase in CRISIS INVERSION STRATEGIES – THEORY OR REALITY IN ROMANIA OF 2009? 
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costs of finance and cuts of general operating expenses. In order to try 
counterbalance crisis effects, most companies resorted to cuts of administrative 
expenses, rent renegotiations, improvement of operational efficiency of the 
company, reevaluation of profitability lines of products / customer segments. 
In 2009, the main points of interest were cost cuts, maintaining market share, 
development of new products/services, risk management, management of public 
relations and personnel cutbacks.  
In terms of planning, most companies established their budgets based on the 
national currency / Euro parity. During October 2008 – March 2009, the national 
currency was devaluated from 3.5 lei/Euro to 4.3 lei/Euro and some specialists 
estimated an exchange rate of 4.8-4.9 lei/Euro by the end of 2009. This situation 
forced companies to reevaluate their budgets and to take into account an average 
exchange rate of 4.2-4.4 lei/Euro for the year 2009. By the end of 2009, the 
average exchange rate reached 4.2373 lei/Euro. In order to try protecting their 
business, most companies resorted to daily transactions and used several currencies 
in their activity. 
Manufacturers and distributors were rather optimistic in terms of profit for 
the year 2009, while banks were less optimistic. 
The main purpose of the questionnaire was to identify the crisis inversion 
strategies used by companies present in Romania since the fourth quarter 2008 
until the first quarter 2009. Most companies used strategy revision, cost cuts and 
combined efforts. On the contrary, none of the companies included in this study 
had the intention to use sales of assets as strategy. 
WHAT SHOULD HAPPEN IN ORDER TO OVERCOME THE CRISIS? 
The experience of national and regional crises in the past decades allows 
specialists to identify key indicators which need to be monitored in order to try 
forecasting crises. These are (V’yugina, 2009): commercial sector cost erosion; 
pyramidal nature of national debt; interest coverage ratio; return on bank assets; 
rapid growth of credit portfolio; contraction of deposits; non-performing loans 
(NPL) ratio; growth and maturity of credits to foreign banks; “bubble” asset price. 
Due to the financial aspects of the crisis, specialists support the idea that the 
world will not be able to overcome this crisis without a systemic reform of the 
banking system. Banks must be forced to consolidate their balances, not to use 
special vehicles (SPVs, different “conduits”), to considerably improve the internal Ruxandra CIULU 
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precautions of banks and to analyze relationship between shareholders and 
management (Daianu, 2008 II). 
Also, it is extremely important for certain people to understand that the “free 
market” is not the same as “deregulated market” (Daianu, 2008 II). If we are 
unable to regulate markets, inevitable consequences are market misfunctionalities, 
which implies important costs for most participants in the market economy. The 
thesis that markets function perfectly, that they are effective in no matter what 
circumstances is considered nowadays a fantasy, this being especially true for 
financial markets. Therefore, the crisis does not have only cyclic reasons, but also 
structural ones, which caused lack of transparence in financial markets due to 
globalization of transactions, regulation problems, multitude of conflicts of interest, 
use of inadequate quantitative methods, etc. 
The financial innovation of the past decades encouraged financial 
intermediations, but reduced transparency of financial markets, which is rather 
worrying. Without financial transparency, without possibilities to realistically 
evaluate the risk of a transaction, without trying to overcome major conflicts of 
interest, confidence in financial markets and, finally, in the economy, are lost. 
“Developing countries are hit by successive shocks; at the same time, 
developed countries are in recession and banks have limited loans. The countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe are most threatened”, argued Robert Zoellick, president 
of The World Bank (Şerbǎnescu, 2009). There is a simple explanation. In Central 
and Eastern Europe, private foreign capital has caused a real chaos in the past 
twenty years. This was an ideal territory for strong and fast expansion. The reason 
was to transform the region into a consumption market for western products.  
Situation in the European Union is fairly serious. In all EU and also in 
Romania, the index of economic confidence has decreased since September 2008 
until March 2009, while afterwards it recorded growth (BT Asset Management, 
2009). Notable exceptions are retail sales and managers, who are more optimistic, 
due to the fact that May was the fourth consecutive month when the index records 
growth (BT Asset Management, 2009). During the past few months, Romanian 
consumers have been more pessimistic than the rest of the EU regarding the 
evolution of the economy. 
There are businessmen who argue that Romania has a unique occasion to 
develop even during the crisis, if the country has the ability to attract foreign 
capitals and companies who relocate from other countries (Bloombiz, 2008). Also, CRISIS INVERSION STRATEGIES – THEORY OR REALITY IN ROMANIA OF 2009? 
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it is absolutely necessary to stimulate consumption, demand, and loans as they are 
the only means to overcome recession.  
Recently, Romania has recorded a new concern regarding its competitive 
capacity. Based on a statistics published by Deloitte, Romania has only 30 out of 
the first 500 companies in Central Europe in terms of revenues in 2007, 50% of 
those detained by Czech Republic and Hungary and 16% of those detained by 
Poland (Ziarul Financiar, 2008). Another statistics shows that only 5% of 
Romanian small and medium size enterprises (SME) are competitive on the 
European market (Balea & Sava, 2008). If Romania does not change strategy, the 
post-crisis situation can become even more worrying. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Romania is just a drop in the ocean of the world economy, but it is ‘our 
drop’ and everything that goes right or wrong affects our everyday lives. We have 
not prepared for this crisis, instead we preferred to ignore it and consider that it will 
have effect only beyond our borders. The same mentality influenced many 
managers in Romania, who are now in difficult positions and need to justify 
misfunctionalities in their companies.  
The study reveals that all companies seem to be influenced by liquidity 
levels, ability to access capital, by payment delays and cuts of general operating 
expenses. Companies are forced to renegotiate rent, improve operational efficiency 
of the company and re-evaluate lines of products / customer segments profitability. 
These are all realities of nowadays world economy and most companies need to 
address these issues.  
What makes the difference and draws the line between successful and 
unsuccessful companies are the way they address these issues and, more exactly, 
strategies used by management. Most respondents reported use of strategy revision, 
cost cuts and combined efforts. On the contrary, none of them has been using or 
has the intention to use sales of assets as a strategy. This proves conservationism 
and, maybe, a typical Romanian mentality, originating from the communist era 
(‘just keep it – you don’t know when you are going to need it’).  
Unfortunately, we have not identified any organization whose managers are 
able to use the crisis for growth, when many competitors encounter problems in 
maintaining their level of sales or even their market share. Instead, they are all Ruxandra CIULU 
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going for the ‘classical’ approach, trying to reduce costs and ensure survival until 
the end of the crisis. 
A possible continuation of this research would be a regional study on 
strategies used by managers in Central and Eastern Europe in order to overcome 
the crisis and, after the crisis ends, to evaluate the results they obtained. 
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